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Before the twentieth century, almost all increases in crop and ani-
mal production occurred as a result of enlarging the area cultivated. By 
the end of that century, almost all increases were coming from increases 
in land productivity—in output per acre or per hectare. This was an 
exceedingly short period in which to make a transition from a natural 
resource–based to a science-based system of agricultural production. In 
the presently developed countries, this transition began in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. In most developing countries, the transition 
did not begin until well into the second half of the twentieth century. 
For some of the poorest countries in the world, the transition has not 
yet begun.
During the second half of the twentieth century world population 
more than doubled—from approximately 2.5 billion in 1950 to 6.0 bil-
lion in 2000. The demands placed on global agricultural production 
arising out of population and income growth almost tripled. By 2050, 
world population is projected to grow to between 9 and 10 billion peo-
ple. Most of the growth is expected to occur in poor countries where 
the income elasticity of demand for food remains high. Even moder-
ately high income growth, combined with projected population growth, 
could result in nearly doubling the demands placed on the world’s farm-
ers by 2050 (Johnson 2000; United Nations 2001).
The most difficult challenges will occur during the next two or three 
decades as both population and income in many of the world’s poor-
est countries continue to grow rapidly. But rapid decline in the rate of 
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population growth in such populous countries as India and China lends 
credence to United Nations projections that by mid-century the global 
rate of population growth will slow substantially. The demand for food 
arising out of income growth is also expected to slow as incomes rise 
and the income elasticity of demand for food declines. In the interim, 
very substantial increases in scientific and technical effort will be re-
quired, particularly in the world’s poorest countries, if growth in food 
production is to keep pace with growth in demand.
AGRICULTURE IN DEVELOPMENT THOUGHT
Economic understanding of the process of agricultural development 
has made substantial advances over the last half century. In the early 
post–World War II literature, agriculture, along with other natural re-
source–based industries, was viewed as a sector from which resources 
could be extracted to fund development in the industrial sector (Lewis 
1954, p. 139; Ranis and Fei 1961; Rostow 1956). Growth in agricultural 
production was viewed as an essential condition, or even a precondi-
tion, for growth in the rest of the economy. But the process by which ag-
ricultural growth was generated remained outside the concern of most 
development economists.
By the early 1960s a new perspective, more fully informed by both 
agricultural science and economics, was beginning to emerge. It had 
become increasingly clear that much of agricultural technology was lo-
cation specific. Techniques developed in advanced countries were not 
generally directly transferable to less developed countries with differ-
ent climates and resource endowments. Evidence had also accumulated 
that only limited productivity gains were to be had by the reallocation 
of resources within traditional peasant agriculture. 
In his iconoclastic book Transforming Traditional Agriculture, 
Theodore W. Schultz (1964) insists that peasants in traditional agrar-
ian societies are rational allocators of available resources and that 
they have remained poor because most poor countries provide them 
with only limited technical and economic opportunities to which they 
can respond—that is, they are “poor but efficient.” If given the inputs 
and know-how of their modern counterparts, they too could succeed, 
Schultz maintains: 
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The principal sources of the high productivity of modern agricul-
ture are reproducible sources. They consist of particular material 
inputs and of skills and other capabilities required to use such in-
puts successfully . . . 
 But these modern material inputs are seldom ready-made . . . 
 In general, what is available is a body of useful knowledge 
which has made it possible for the advanced countries to produce 
for their own use factors that are technically superior to those em-
ployed elsewhere. This body of knowledge can be used to develop 
similar, and as a rule superior, new factors appropriate to the bio-
logical and other conditions that are specific to the agriculture of 
poor countries. (pp. 146–147)
This thesis implies three types of relatively high-payoff investments 
for agricultural development: 1) the capacity of agricultural research in-
stitutions to generate new location-specific technical knowledge; 2) the 
capacity of the technology supply industries to develop, produce, and 
market new technical inputs; and 3) the schooling and nonformal (ex-
tension) education of rural people to enable them to use the new knowl-
edge and technology effectively. The enthusiasm with which this high-
payoff input model was accepted and transformed into doctrine was 
due at least as much to the success of plant breeders and agronomists in 
developing fertilizer and management-responsive green revolution crop 
varieties for the tropics as to the power of Schultz’s ideas.1
The Schultz “high-payoff input model” remained incomplete, how-
ever, even as a model of technical change in agriculture. It did not at-
tempt to explain how economic conditions induce an efficient path of 
technical change for the agricultural sector of a particular society. Nor 
does the high-payoff input model attempt to explain how economic 
conditions induce the development of new institutions, such as public 
sector agricultural experiment stations, that become the suppliers of lo-
cation-specific new knowledge and technology. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, Hayami and Ruttan (1971, 1985) and 
Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) formulated a model of induced technical 
change in which the development and application of new technology is 
endogenous to the economic system. Building on the Hicksian model 
of factor-saving technical change and their own experience in south-
east Asia, they proposed a model in which the direction of technical 
change in agriculture was induced by changes (or differences) in rela-
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tive resource endowments and factor prices. In this model, alternative 
agricultural technologies are developed to facilitate the substitution of 
relatively abundant (hence cheap) factors for relatively scarce (hence 
expensive) factors. Two kinds of technology generally correspond to 
this taxonomy. Mechanical technology is labor saving, designed to sub-
stitute power and machinery for labor. Biological and chemical technol-
ogy is land saving, designed to substitute labor-intensive production 
practices and industrial inputs such as fertilizer and plant- and animal-
protection chemicals for land. Both the technical conditions of produc-
tion and historical experience suggest that changes in land productivity 
and labor productivity are relatively independent (Griliches 1968).
The process of induced technical change can be illustrated from 
the historical experience of Japan and the United States, illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. In Panel A of Figure 4.1, the horizontal axis is the price of 
fertilizer relative to the price of land and the vertical axis the amount of 
fertilizer per hectare of agricultural land. In Panel B of Figure 4.1, the 
horizontal axis is the price of draft power—both animal and mechani-
cal—relative to the price of labor and the vertical axis the amount of 
draft power per worker. Reading from right (1880) to left (1980), as 
the price of fertilizer declined relative to the price of land, fertilizer use 
per hectare rose in both countries (Panel A). Similarly, as the price of 
draft power declined relative to the price of labor, the use of power per 
worker rose in both countries (Panel B).
Throughout the period 1880–1980, Japanese farmers used more fer-
tilizer per hectare than U.S. farmers, and U.S. farmers used more power 
per worker than Japanese farmers. These differences in use of fertilizer 
per unit of land and of draft power per worker between the two coun-
tries, and the changes in each country between 1880 and 1980, were 
not the result of simple factor substitution in response to relative price 
changes. The large changes in factor ratios were made possible only by 
the very substantial advances in biological and mechanical technology 
that facilitated the substitution of fertilizer for land and draft power 
for labor. These technical changes were induced by the differences and 
changes in relative factor price ratios (Hayami and Ruttan 1985, pp. 
176–197).2 Over time, particularly since World War II, there has been 
some convergence in relative factor prices and in relative intensity of 
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a Relation between fertilizer input per hectare of arable land and the fertilizer–arable land price ratio: hectares of arable land that can be 
purchased by one ton of N + P2O5 + K2O, contained in commercial fertilizers. 
b Relation between farm draft power per male worker and power labor price ratio: hectares of work days that can be purchased by one 
horsepower (hp) of tractor or draft animal.
SOURCE: Hayami and Ruttan (1985, pp. 179–180).
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Figure 4.1  Induced Technical Change in Fertilizer and Draft Power, the United States and Japan (quinquennial  
observations for 1880–1980)
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Advances in mechanical technology in agriculture have been inti-
mately associated with the industrial revolution. But the mechanization 
of agriculture cannot be treated as simply the adaptation of industrial 
methods of production to agriculture. The spatial dimension of crop 
production requires that the machines suitable for agricultural mechani-
zation be mobile—they must move across or through materials that are 
immobile (Brewster 1950). The seasonal characteristic of agricultural 
production requires a series of specialized machines—for land prepara-
tion, planting, pest and pathogen control, and harvesting—designed for 
sequential operations, each of which is carried out for only a few days or 
weeks in each season. One result is that a fully mechanized agriculture 
is typically very capital intensive. Advances in biological technology in 
crop production involve one or more of the following three elements: 
1) land and water resource development to provide a more favorable 
environment for plant growth; 2) the addition of organic and inorganic 
sources of plant nutrition to the soil to stimulate plant growth and the 
use of biological and chemical means to protect plants from pests and 
pathogens; and 3) selection and breeding of new, biologically efficient 
crop varieties specifically adapted to respond to those elements in the 
environment that are subject to management.
Advances in mechanical technology are a primary source of growth 
in labor productivity; advances in biological technology are a primary 
source of growth in land productivity. There are, of course, exceptions 
to this analytical distinction. For example, in nineteenth-century Japan, 
horse plowing was developed as a technology to cultivate more deeply 
to enhance yield (Hayami and Ruttan 1985, p. 75).3 In the United States, 
the replacement of horses by tractors released land from animal feed to 
food production (Olmstead and Rhode 2001; White 2000). At the most 
sophisticated level, technical change often involves complementary ad-
vances in both mechanical and biological technology. For most coun-
tries, the research resource allocation issue is the relative emphasis that 
should be given to advancing biological and mechanical technology.
The model of induced technical change has important implications 
for resource allocation in agricultural research. In labor-abundant and 
land-constrained developing countries, like China and India, research 
resources are most productively directed to advancing yield-enhancing 
biological technology. In contrast, land-abundant Brazil has realized 
very high returns from research directed to releasing the productivity 
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constraints on its problem soils. Discovery of the yield-enhancing ef-
fects of heavy lime application on acidic aluminum-containing soils has 
opened its Campos Cerrados (great plains) region to extensive mecha-
nized production of maize and soybeans.
MEASURING THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Comparative research on the rate and direction of productivity 
growth in agriculture has gone through three stages. Initially, efforts 
were directed to the measurement of partial productivity ratios and in-
dexes, such as output per worker and per hectare. Intercountry cross-
section and time-series comparisons of output per unit of land and labor 
were first assembled by Collin Clark in his pioneering study, The Con-
ditions of Economic Progress (1940/1957). In the late 1960s, Clark’s 
intercountry comparisons were revived and updated by Yujiro Hayami 
and associates (Hayami 1969; Hayami and Inagi 1969; Hayami, Miller, 
Wade, and Yamashita 1971). These early partial productivity studies 
identified exceedingly wide differences in land and labor productivity 
both among countries and among major world regions. Recent trends 
in land and labor productivity indicate that these wide differences have 
persisted. 
In Figure 4.2, labor productivity (output per worker) is measured on 
the horizontal axis. Land productivity (output per hectare) is measured 
on the vertical axis. The dashed diagonal lines, with the units appear-
ing across the top and down the right-hand side of the figure, trace the 
land-labor factor ratios (hectares of agricultural land per worker). The 
country and regional lines indicate land-labor trajectories for specific 
countries or regions. The partial productivity growth patterns of Figure 
4.2 are displayed in much greater detail in the work of Hayami and 
Ruttan (1985, pp. 117–129). The several country and regional growth 
paths fall broadly into three groups: 1) a land-constrained path in which 
output per hectare has risen faster than output per worker, 2) a land-
abundant path in which output per worker has risen more rapidly than 
output per hectare, and 3) an intermediate growth path in which output 
per worker and per hectare have grown at somewhat comparable rates. 
During the later stages of development, as the price of labor begins 
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Figure 4.2  International Comparison of Land and Labor Productivities  
 by Region: 1961–1990.










SOURCE: Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997, p. 1066).
to rise relative to the price of land, the growth path tends to shift in a 
labor saving direction. If land and labor productivity grow at the same 
rate, as in west Asia and North Africa, historical productivity follows a 
diagonal path. Partial productivity ratios such as those plotted in Figure 
4.2 were employed by Hayami and Ruttan (1970, 1971, pp. 163–205) in 
their initial tests of the induced technical change hypothesis.
A second stage of the research on technical change in agriculture 
involved the estimation of cross-country production functions and the 
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construction of multifactor productivity estimates. In these studies, 
factor inputs—typically land, labor, livestock, capital equipment (ma-
chinery), and current inputs (fertilizer)—were aggregated using either 
factor shares or statistical estimates as the weights for factor aggrega-
tion in multifactor productivity estimates or as elasticity coefficients 
in Cobb-Douglas type production functions.4 Over time, improvements 
in data availability and estimation methods have contributed to greater 
reliability in the estimates. 
The Hayami and Ruttan (1970) and the Kawagoe, Hayami, and 
Ruttan (1985) cross-country metaproduction functions (Lau and Yoto-
poulos 1989) have been used in growth accounting exercises to parti-
tion the sources of differences in agricultural labor and land productiv-
ity between developed and developing countries and among individual 
countries. The results indicated that internal resource endowments (land 
and livestock), modern technical inputs (machinery and fertilizer), and 
human capital (general and technical education) each accounted for ap-
proximately one-fourth of the differences in labor productivity between 
developed countries and less developed countries as groups. Scale 
economies, present in developed countries but not in less developed 
countries, accounted for about 15 percent of the difference.5
The implications of these results for potential growth of labor pro-
ductivity in the agricultural production of less developed countries were 
encouraging. The pressure of population against land resources was not 
a binding constraint on agricultural production. Scale diseconomies 
were not an immediate constraint on labor productivity. Labor produc-
tivity could be increased by several multiples—to levels approximat-
ing the levels in Western Europe in the early 1960s—by investment in 
human capital and in agricultural research, and by more intensive use 
of technical inputs. The historical experience of Japan and the more 
recent experience of Korea and Taiwan did suggest, however, that as 
demand for labor, associated with rapid urban-industrial development, 
draws substantial labor from agriculture, small farm size could become 
a more serious constraint. As the agricultural labor force declines, farm 
consolidation results in a rise in the land/labor ratio and a rise in labor 
productivity.
A third stage in agricultural productivity analysis has involved ef-
forts to test for the convergence of growth rates and levels of multi-
factor productivity between and among developing and less developed 
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countries. Most of these studies have employed the Malmquist or fron-
tier productivity approach. The basic idea of the Malmquist approach 
is to construct the best-practice, or frontier, production function and to 
measure the distance of each country in the sample from the frontier 
by applying a linear programming method known as data envelopment 
analysis. The combination of inputs is allowed to vary along an efficient 
frontier, rather than the fixed coefficient production functions employed 
in the second-stage studies, to partition changes in multifactor produc-
tivity into technical change and efficiency change components.6 Techni-
cal change measures the shift in the best-practice or frontier production 
functions; efficiency change measures change in the difference between 
average practice and the best-practice productivity frontier. 
These studies generally indicate a widening of the agricultural pro-
ductivity gap between developed and developing countries between the 
early 1960s and the early 1990s. Within the group of developed coun-
tries, except for continuing divergence between northern and south-
ern Europe, productivity levels have converged modestly. Developing 
countries as a group experienced declining total factor productivity 
relative to the frontier countries. There is, however, some evidence of 
convergence toward the still relatively low frontier productivity levels 
within African agriculture (Arnade 1998; Ball et al. 2001; Chavas 2001; 
Fulginiti and Perrin 1997, 1998; Suhariyanto, Lusigi, and Thirtle 2001; 
Thirtle, Hadley, and Townsend 1995; Trueblood and Coggins 2001).
The partitioning of total factor productivity into technical efficiency 
and technical change in Asian agriculture is illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
During the period from 1965–66 to 1995–96 the gap between average 
practice, as measured by technical efficiency change, and best practice, 
as measured by technical change, widened. As a result, average total 
factor productivity change (TFP) advanced more slowly than the rate of 
technical change in the countries on the efficiency frontier. Another way 
of making the same point is to say that technical efficiency has lagged 
behind technical change associated with the rapid adoption of green 
revolution seed-fertilizer technology in the frontier countries (Roseg-
rant and Hazell 2000, pp. 123–60). The results are not inconsistent with 
a technical trajectory implied by the induced technical change hypoth-
esis. Technical change in Asia has been strongly biased in a land-sav-
ing direction, in response to the relatively severe constraints on land 
resources. This bias is reflected in both a land-saving shift in the pro-
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duction function and the substitution of technical inputs, particularly 
fertilizer and pest and pathogen control chemicals, for land (Murgai 
2001; Murgai, Ali, and Byerlee 2001). Similar trends have taken place 
in some of the more land-constrained, labor-intensive agricultural sys-
tems in Africa and Latin America.
TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABILITY
Growth in total factor productivity in agriculture, arising out of 
technical change and improvements in efficiency, has made an exceed-
ingly important contribution to economic growth. Within rural areas, 
growth of land and labor productivity has led to substantial poverty 
reduction. Productivity growth has also released substantial resources 
to the rest of the economy and contributed to reductions in the price 
of food in both rural and urban areas (Irz et al. 2001; Shane, Roe, and 
Gopinath 1998). The decline in the price of food, which in many parts 
of the world is the single most important factor determining the buying 
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Figure 4.3  Efficiency Change, Technical Change, and TFP Change in 
Asian Agriculture
SOURCE: Suhariyanto, Lusigi, and Thirtle (2001, p. 11).
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industrial development in a number of important emerging economies. 
These price declines have also meant that, in countries or regions that 
have not experienced such gains in agricultural productivity, farmers 
have lost competitive advantage in world markets and consumers have 
failed to share fully in the gains from economic growth. But what about 
the future? In the next two sections I will first address the environmen-
tal and resource constraints and then the scientific and the technical 
constraints that will confront the world’s farmers as they attempt to 
respond to the demands that will be placed on them.7
RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
The leading resource and environmental constraints faced by the 
world’s farmers include soil loss and degradation; waterlogging and 
salinity of soil; the coevolution of pests, pathogens, and hosts; and the 
impact of climate change. Part of my concern is with the feedback of 
the environmental impacts of agricultural intensification on agricultural 
production itself (Tilman et al. 2001).
Soil. Soil degradation and erosion have been widely regarded as 
major threats to sustainable growth in agricultural production in both 
developed and developing countries. It has been suggested, for example, 
that by 2050 it may be necessary to feed “twice as many people with 
half as much topsoil” (Harris 1990, p. 115). However, attempts to assess 
the implications of soil erosion and degradation confront serious dif-
ficulties. Water and wind erosion estimates are measures of the amount 
of soil moved from one place to another rather than of soil actually lost. 
Relatively few studies provide the information necessary to estimate 
yield loss from erosion and degradation. Studies in the United States 
by the Natural Resources Conservation Service have been interpreted 
to indicate that if 1992 erosion rates continued for 100 years the yield 
loss at the end of the period would amount to only 2–3 percent (Cros-
son 1995a). An exceedingly careful review of the long term relationship 
between soil erosion, degradation, and crop productivity in China and 
Indonesia concludes that there has been little loss of organic matter or 
mineral nutrients and that use of fertilizer has been able to compensate 
for loss of nitrogen (Lindert 2000). A careful review of the international 
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literature suggests that yield losses at the global level might be roughly 
double the rates estimated for the United States (Crosson 1995b). 
At the global level, soil loss and degradation are not likely to rep-
resent a serious constraint on agricultural production over the next half 
century. But soil loss and degradation could become a serious constraint 
at the local or regional level in some fragile resource areas. For example, 
yield constraints due to soil erosion and degradation seem especially 
severe in the arid and semiarid regions of sub-Saharan Africa. A slow-
ing of agricultural productivity growth in robust resource areas could 
also lead to intensification or expansion of crop and animal production 
that would put pressure on soil in fragile resource areas—like tropi-
cal rain forests, arid and semiarid regions, and high mountain areas. In 
some such areas, the possibility of sustainable growth in production 
can be enhanced by irrigation, terracing, careful soil management, and 
changes in commodity mix and farming systems (Lal 1995; Niemeijer 
and Mazzucato 2002; Smil 2000).
Water. During the last half-century, water has become a resource 
of high and increasing value in many countries. In the arid and semiarid 
areas of the world, water scarcity is becoming an increasingly serious 
constraint on growth of agricultural production (Gleick 2000; Raskin et 
al. 1997; Seckler, Molden, and Barker 1999). During the last half centu-
ry, irrigated area in developing countries more than doubled, from less 
than 100 million hectares to more than 200 million hectares. About half 
of developing-country grain production is grown on irrigated land. The 
International Water Management Institute has projected that by 2025 
most regions or countries in a broad sweep from north China across 
East Asia to North Africa and northern sub-Saharan Africa will experi-
ence either absolute or severe water scarcity.8
Irrigation systems can be a double-edged answer to water scarcity, 
since they may have substantial externalities that affect agricultural 
production directly. Common problems of surface water irrigation sys-
tems include waterlogging and salinity resulting from excessive water 
use and poorly designed drainage systems (Murgai, Ali, and Byerlee 
2001). In the Aral Sea Basin in central Asia, the effects of excessive 
water withdrawal for cotton and rice production, combined with inad-
equate drainage facilities, have resulted in such extensive waterlogging 
and salinity, as well as contraction of the Aral Sea, that the economic 
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viability of the entire region is threatened (Glazovsky 1995). Another 
common externality results from the extraction of water from under-
ground aquifers in excess of the rate at which the aquifers are naturally 
recharged, resulting in a falling groundwater level and rising pump-
ing costs. In some countries, like Pakistan and India, these externalities 
have in some cases been sufficient to offset the contribution of expan-
sion of irrigated area to agricultural production.
However, the lack of water resources is unlikely to become a severe 
constraint on global agricultural production in the next half century. 
The scientific and technical efforts devoted to improvement in water 
productivity have been much more limited than efforts to enhance land 
productivity (Molden, Amarasinghe, and Hussain 2001), so significant 
productivity improvements in water use are surely possible. Institution-
al innovations will be required to create incentives to enhance water 
productivity (Saleth and Dinar 2000). But in 50 to 60 of the world’s 
most arid countries, plus major regions in several other countries, com-
petition from household, industrial, and environmental demands will 
reallocate water away from agricultural irrigation. In many of these 
countries, increases in water productivity and changes in farming sys-
tems will permit continued increases in agricultural production. In other 
countries, the reduction in irrigated area will cause a significant con-
straint on agricultural production. Since these countries are among the 
world’s poorest, some will have great difficulty in meeting food secu-
rity needs from either domestic production or food imports.
Pests. Pest control has become an increasingly serious constraint 
on agricultural production in spite of dramatic advances in pest control 
technology. In the United States, pesticides have been the most rap-
idly growing input in agricultural production over the last half century. 
Major pests include pathogens, insects, and weeds. For much of the 
post–World War II era, pest control has meant application of chemicals. 
Pesticidal activity of dichlorodiphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) was dis-
covered by scientists in the late 1930s. It was used in World War II to 
protect American troops against typhus and malaria. Early tests found 
DDT to be effective against almost all insect species and relatively 
harmless to humans, animals, and plants. It was relatively inexpensive 
and effective at low application levels. Chemical companies rapidly 
introduced a series of other synthetic organic pesticides in the 1950s 
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(Ruttan 1982; Palladino 1996). The initial effectiveness of DDT and 
other synthetic organic chemicals for crop and animal pest control after 
World War II led to the neglect of other pest control strategies.
By the early 1960s, an increasing body of evidence suggested that 
the benefits of the synthetic organic chemical pesticides introduced in 
the 1940s and 1950s were obtained at substantial cost. One set of costs 
included the direct and indirect health effects on wildlife populations 
and on humans (Carson 1962; Pingali and Roger 1995). A second set of 
costs involved the destruction of beneficial insects and the emergence 
of pesticide resistance in target populations. A fundamental problem in 
efforts to develop methods of control for pests and pathogens is that the 
control results in evolutionary selection pressure for the emergence of 
organisms that are resistant to the control technology (Palumbi 2001). 
When DDT was introduced in California to control the cottony cushion 
scale, its predator the vedalia beetle turned out to be more susceptible 
to DDT than the scale. In 1947, just one year after the introduction of 
DDT, citrus growers were confronted with a resurgence of the scale 
population. In Peru, the cotton bollworm quickly built up resistance to 
DDT and to the even more effective—and more toxic to humans—or-
ganophosphate insecticides that were adopted to replace DDT (Palla-
dino 1996, pp. 36–41).
The solution to the pesticide crisis offered by the entomological 
community was integrated pest management (IPM). IPM involved the 
integrated use of an array of pest control strategies: making hosts more 
resistant to pests, finding biological controls for pests, cultivation prac-
tices, and also chemical control if needed. At the time integrated pest 
management began to be promoted in the 1960s, it represented little 
more than a rhetorical device. But by the 1970s, a number of important 
IPM programs had been designed and implemented. However, exag-
gerated expectations that dramatic reductions in chemical pesticide use 
could be achieved without significant decline in crop yields as a result 
of IPM have yet only been partially realized (Gianessi 1991; Lewis et 
al. 1997).
My own judgment is that the problem of pest and pathogen con-
trol will represent a more serious constraint on sustainable growth in 
agricultural production at a global level than either land or water con-
straints.9 In part, this is because the development of pest- and pathogen-
resistant crop varieties and chemical methods of control both tend to 
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induce the evolution of more resistant pests or pathogens. In addition, 
international travel and trade are spreading the newly resistant pests and 
pathogens to new environments. As a result, pest control technologies 
must constantly be replaced and updated. The coevolution of patho-
gens, insect pests, and weeds in response to control efforts will continue 
to represent a major factor in directing the allocation of agricultural 
research resources to assure that agricultural output can be maintained 
at present levels or continue to grow.10
Climate. Measurements taken in Hawaii in the late 1950s indicated 
that carbon dioxide (CO2) was increasing in the atmosphere. Begin-
ning in the late 1960s, computer model simulations indicated possible 
changes in temperature and precipitation that could occur because of 
human-induced emission of CO2 and other greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere. By the early 1980s a fairly broad consensus had emerged 
in the climate change research community that energy production and 
consumption from fossil fuels could, by 2050, result in a doubling of 
the atmospheric concentration of CO2, a rise in global average tempera-
ture by 2.5oC–4.5oC (2.7oF–8.0oF) and a complex pattern of worldwide 
climate change (Ruttan 2001, pp. 515–520). 
Since the mid-1980s, a succession of studies has attempted to as-
sess how an increase in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse 
gases could affect agricultural production through three channels: 
1) higher CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere may have a positive 
“fertilizer effect” on some crop plants (and weeds); 2) higher tempera-
tures could result in a rise in the sea level, resulting in inundation of 
coastal areas and intrusion of saltwater into groundwater aquifers; and 
3) changes in temperature, rainfall, and sunlight may also alter agricul-
tural production, although the effects will vary greatly across regions. 
Early assessments of the impact of climate change on global agriculture 
suggested a negative annual impact in the 2–4 percent range by the 
third decade of this century (Parry 1990). More recent projections are 
more optimistic (Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw 1994; Rosenzweig 
and Hillel 1998). The early models have been criticized for a “dumb 
farmer” assumption—they did not incorporate how farmers would re-
spond to climate change with different crops and growing methods. Ef-
forts to incorporate how public and private suppliers of knowledge and 
technology might adjust to climate change are just beginning (Evenson 
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1988). But even the more sophisticated models have been unable to 
incorporate the synergistic interactions among climate change, soil loss 
and degradation, ground and surface water storage, and the incidence 
of pests and pathogens. These interactive effects could combine into a 
significantly larger burden on growth in agricultural production than 
the effects of each constraint considered separately. One thing that is 
certain is that a country or region that has not acquired substantial ag-
ricultural research capacity will have great difficulty in responding to 
anticipated climate change impacts.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS
The achievement of sustained growth in agricultural production 
over the next half century represents at least as difficult a challenge 
to science and technology development as the transition to a science-
based system of agricultural production during the twentieth century 
did. In assessing the role of advances in science and technology in re-
leasing the several constraints on growth of agricultural production and 
productivity, the induced technical change hypothesis is useful. To the 
extent that technical change in agriculture is endogenous, scientific and 
technical resources will be directed to sustaining or enhancing the pro-
ductivity of those factors that are relatively scarce and expensive. Farm-
ers in those countries that have not yet acquired the capacity to invent 
or adapt technology specific to their resource endowments will continue 
to find it difficult to respond to the growth of domestic or international 
demand.
In the 1950s and 1960s, it was not difficult to anticipate the likely 
sources of increase in agricultural production over the next several de-
cades (Millikan and Hapgood 1967; Ruttan 1956; Schultz 1964). Ad-
vances in crop production would come from expansion in area irrigated, 
from more intensive application of improved fertilizer and crop protec-
tion chemicals, and from the development of crop varieties that would 
be more responsive to technical inputs and management. Advances in 
animal production would come from genetic improvements and ad-
vances in animal nutrition. At a more fundamental level, increases in 
crop yields would come from genetic advances that would change plant 
architecture to make possible higher plant populations per hectare and 
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would increase the ratio of grain to straw in individual plants. Increases 
in production of animals and animal products would come about by 
genetic and management changes that would decrease the proportion of 
feed devoted to animal maintenance and increase the proportion used to 
produce usable animal products.
I find it much more difficult to tell a convincing story about the 
likely sources of increase in crop and animal production over the next 
half century than I did a half century ago. The ratio of grain to straw is 
already high in many crops, and severe physiological constraints arise 
in trying to increase it further. There are also physiological limits to 
increasing the efficiency with which animal feed produces animal prod-
ucts. These constraints will impinge most severely in areas that have 
already achieved the highest levels of output per hectare or per animal 
unit—in Western Europe, North America and East Asia. Indeed, the 
constraints are already evident. The yield increases from incremental 
fertilizer application are falling. The reductions in labor input from the 
use of larger and more powerful mechanical equipment are declining as 
well. As average grain yields have risen from 1–2 metric tons per hect-
are to 6–8 metric tons per hectare over the last half century in the most 
favored areas, the share of research budgets devoted to maintenance 
research—the research needed to maintain existing crop and animal 
productivity levels—has risen relative to total research budgets (Pluck-
nett and Smith 1986). Cost per scientist year has been rising faster than 
the general price level (Huffman and Evenson 1993; Pardey, Craig, and 
Hallaway 1989). I find it difficult to escape a conclusion that both pub-
lic and private sector agricultural research, in those countries that have 
achieved the highest levels of agricultural productivity, have begun to 
experience diminishing returns.
Perhaps advances in molecular biology and genetic engineering will 
relieve the scientific and technical constraints on the growth of agricul-
tural production. In the past, advances in fundamental knowledge have 
often initiated new cycles of research productivity (Evenson and Kislev 
1975). Transgenetically modified crops, particularly maize, soybeans, 
and cotton, have diffused rapidly since they were first introduced in the 
mid-1990s. Four countries—the United States, Argentina, Canada, and 
China—accounted for 99 percent of the 109 million acres of transgenic 
crop area in 2000 (James 2000). The applications that are presently 
available in the field are primarily in the area of plant protection and 
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animal health. Among the more dramatic examples is the development 
of cotton varieties that incorporate resistance to the cotton bollworm. 
The effect has been to reduce the application of chemical control from 
8–10 to 1–2 spray applications per season (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and 
Nelson 2000). These advances are enabling producers to push crop and 
animal yields closer to their genetically determined biological potential. 
But they have not yet raised biological yield ceilings above the levels 
that have been achieved by researchers employing the older methods 
based on Mendelian genetics (Ruttan 1999). 
Advances in agricultural applications of genetic engineering in de-
veloped countries will almost certainly be slowed by developed coun-
try concerns about the possible environmental and health impacts of 
transgenetically modified plants and foods. One effect of these concerns 
has been to shift the attention of biotechnology research away from 
agricultural applications in favor of industrial and pharmaceutical ap-
plications (Committee on Environmental Impacts 2002, pp. 221–229). 
This shift will delay the development of productivity-enhancing bio-
technology applications and agricultural development in less developed 
economies. 
I find it somewhat surprising that it is difficult for me to share the 
current optimism about the dramatic gains to be realized from the ap-
plication of molecular genetics and genetic engineering. One of my first 
professional papers was devoted to refuting the pessimistic projections 
for agricultural productivity and production that were common in the 
early 1950s (Ruttan 1956). Other students of this subject have presented 
more optimistic perspectives (Runge et al. 2003; Waggoner 1997). But I 
have not yet seen evidence that the new genetics technologies, although 
undoubtedly powerful, will or can overcome the long-term prospect of 
diminishing returns to research on agricultural productivity. 
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SYSTEMS
To this point, I have given major attention to the role of agricultural 
research as a source of technical change and productivity growth. In 
this section I sketch the evolution and structure of national and inter-
national agricultural research systems.11 The institutional arrangements 
for the support of agricultural research began in the middle of the nine-
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teenth century. In 1843 John Bennet Lawes (subsequently knighted) 
established, and later endowed, an agricultural experiment station on 
his family estate of Rothamsted, in Hertfordshire, England. In Germa-
ny, the introduction by Justus von Liebig of the laboratory method of 
training in organic chemistry at Giessen led directly to the establish-
ment of the first publicly supported agricultural experiment station at 
Mockern, Saxony, in 1852. The German method of public-sector ag-
ricultural research became the model for agricultural research in the 
United States. A number of American students who studied with Liebig 
were responsible for establishing the research program of the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture and the agricultural experiment stations at the 
new land-grant public universities in the late 1800s (Ruttan 1982). The 
basic structure of the U.S. agricultural research system has become in-
creasingly complex, with the federal government, individual states, and 
the private sector each playing an important role. The sources and flows 
of funding for 1998 are shown in Figure 4.4. 
a SAES stands for State Agricultural Experiment Station.
SOURCE: Adapted from Fuglie, Ballenger, Day, Klotz, Ollinger, Reilly, Vasavada, 
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Figure 4.4  Sources and Flows of Funding for Agricultural Research: 1998
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Substantial progress was made in the first several decades of the 
twentieth century in initiating public sector agricultural research capac-
ity in Latin America and in the colonial economies of Asia and Africa. 
Research efforts were focused primarily on tropical export crops such 
as sugar, rubber, cotton, bananas, coffee, and tea. The disruption of in-
ternational trade during the Great Depression of the 1930s and during 
World War II, followed by the breakup of colonial empires, aborted or 
severely weakened many of these efforts.
By the early 1960s, the U.S. development assistance agency and 
the assistance agencies of the former colonial powers were beginning 
to channel substantial resources into strengthening agricultural educa-
tion and research institutions, with a stronger focus on domestic food 
crops in developing countries. The Ford and Rockefeller foundations 
collaborated in the establishment of four international agricultural re-
search institutes: the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the 
Philippines, the International Center for the Improvement of Maize and 
Wheat (CIMMYT) in Mexico, the International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria, and the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia. In 1971, the two foundations, joined 
by the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the Unit-
ed Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
and a number of bilateral donor agencies, formed the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). By the early 
1990s the CGIAR systems had expanded to 18 centers or institutes.
From the 1950s through the 1980s, the resources available to the 
new national and international research institutions from national and 
international sources expanded rapidly. Both the national and the inter-
national systems achieved dramatic success in the development of high-
er yielding, “green revolution” wheat, rice, and maize varieties (Alston 
et al. 2000; Ruttan 2001, pp. 203–223). Several developing countries—
India, China, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa—achieved world 
class agricultural research capacity. During the 1990s, however, growth 
of public sector support for both national and international agricultural 
research slowed substantially. Support for private sector agricultural re-
search, which remains concentrated primarily in developed countries, 
has continued to grow rapidly.12
An active and vibrant global agricultural research system will be 
needed to sustain growth in agricultural productivity into the twenty-
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first century. But the system itself is still incomplete. When it is com-
pleted, it will include strong public national research institutions, linked 
to higher education, that can work effectively with the international sys-
tem and other national systems. This network will be complemented by 
a scientifically sophisticated technology supply industry, composed of 
both national and multinational firms. The research systems in most de-
veloping countries have yet to establish sufficient capacity to make ef-
fective use of the existing advances in knowledge and technology. The 
private sector agricultural technology supply industry, although grow-
ing rapidly, still remains poorly represented in the poorest developing 
countries.
PERSPECTIVE
What are the implications of the resource and environmental con-
straints, the scientific and technical constraints, and the institutional 
constraints on agricultural productivity growth over the next half cen-
tury? In those countries and regions in which land and labor productiv-
ity are already at or approaching scientific and technical frontiers, it will 
be difficult to achieve growth in agricultural productivity comparable to 
the rates achieved over the last half century (Pingali and Heisey 2001; 
Pingali, Moya, and Velasco 1990; Reilly and Fuglie 1998). But in most 
of these countries at the technological frontier, the demand for food will 
rise only slowly. As a result, these countries, except perhaps those that 
are most land-constrained, will have little difficulty in achieving rates 
of growth in agricultural production that will keep up with the slowly 
rising demand for food. Several of the countries near the technologi-
cal frontier, particularly in east Asia, will find it economically advanta-
geous to continue to import substantial quantities of animal feed and 
food grains (Rosegrant and Hazell 2000). 
For those countries in which land and labor productivity levels are 
furthest from frontier levels, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
opportunities exist to enhance agricultural productivity substantially. 
Countries that are land-constrained, such as India, can be expected 
to follow a productivity growth path that places primary emphasis on 
biological technology. In contrast, Brazil, which is still involved in ex-
panding its agricultural land frontier while confronting crop yield con-
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straints in its older agricultural regions, can be expected to follow a 
more balanced productivity growth path. Most of the poor countries 
or regions that find it advantageous to follow a biological technology 
path will have to invest substantially more than in the past to acquire a 
capacity for agricultural research and technology transfer. These invest-
ments will include general and technical education, rural physical infra-
structure, and appropriate research and technology transfer institutions. 
Moreover, gains in labor productivity will depend on the rate of growth 
in demand for labor in the nonfarm sectors of the economy, which in 
turn will create the incentives for substituting mechanical technology 
for labor in agricultural production. If relatively land-abundant coun-
tries, in sub-Saharan Africa for example, fail to develop a strong inter-
sector labor market in which workers can move from rural agricultural 
jobs to urban manufacturing and service jobs, they will end up follow-
ing an East Asian land-saving biological technology path.
I find it more difficult to anticipate the productivity paths that will 
be followed by several other regions. The countries of the former Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) have in the past followed a trajec-
tory somewhat similar to North America (as shown in Figure 4.2). If 
they recover from recent stagnation, these countries may resume their 
historical trajectory.13 The trajectories that will be followed by west 
Asia, North Africa, and other arid regions are highly uncertain. Very 
substantial gains in water productivity will be required to realize gains 
in land productivity in these areas, and very substantial growth in non-
agricultural demand for labor will be required to realize the substantial 
gains in labor productivity that would enable them to continue along the 
intermediate technology trajectory that has characterized the countries 
of southern Europe. The major oil-producing countries will continue 
to expand their imports of food and feed grains. If the world should 
move toward more open trading arrangements, a number of tropical or 
semitropical developing countries would find it advantageous to expand 
their exports of commodities in which their climate and other resources 
give them a comparative advantage and import larger quantities of food 
and feed grains.
While many of the constraints on agricultural productivity discussed 
in this paper are unlikely to represent a threat to global food security 
over the next half century, they will, either individually or collectively, 
become a threat to growth of agricultural production at the regional 
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and local level in a number of the world’s poorest countries. A prima-
ry defense against the uncertainty about resource and environmental 
constraints is agricultural research capacity. The erosion of capacity of 
the international research system will have to be reversed, capacity in 
the presently developed countries will have to be at least maintained, 
and capacity in the developing countries will have to be substantially 
strengthened. Smaller countries will need, at the very least, to strength-
en their capacity to borrow, adapt, and diffuse technology from coun-
tries in comparable agroclimatic regions. It also means that more secure 
bridges must be built between the research systems of what have been 
termed the “island empires” of the agricultural, environmental, and 
health sciences (Mayer and Mayer 1974).
If the world fails to meet its food demands over the next half cen-
tury, the failure will be at least as much in the area of institutional in-
novation as in the area of technical change. This conclusion is not an 
optimistic one. The design of institutions capable of achieving com-
patibility between individual, organizational, and social objectives re-
mains an art rather than a science. At our present stage of knowledge, 
institutional design is analogous to driving down a four-lane highway 
while looking only at the rear-view mirror. We are better at making 
course corrections when we start to run off the highway than at using 
foresight to navigate the transition to sustainable growth in agriculture 
output and productivity.
Notes
 I am indebted to Jay Coggins, Charles Muscoplat, Glenn Pederson, Munisamy Gopi-
nath, David Norse, Philip Pardey, Philip Raup, Timothy Taylor, Colin Thirtle, Michael 
Trueblood, and Michael Waldman for comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of 
this paper. I have also benefited from access to a draft manuscript of the book Ending 
Hunger in Our Lifetime: Food Security and Globalization, by Runge, Senauer, Pardey, 
and Rosegrant (2003).
 1.  The Schultz “poor but efficient” hypothesis was received skeptically by develop-
ment economists who had posited a “backward bending” labor supply curve in 
developing countries’ agriculture. See, for example, Lipton (1968). For a particu-
larly vicious review of Transforming Traditional Agriculture, see Balogh (1964). 
Schultz was the recipient of the 1979 Nobel Prize in Economics, along with W. 
Arthur Lewis, for his contribution to development economics.
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 2.  Hayami and Ruttan’s (1985) induced innovation interpretation of technical 
change has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. See, for 
example, Olmstead and Rhode (1993) and Koppel (1995). For a response to 
these criticisms, see Ruttan and Hayami (1995).
 3.  Before that time, Japanese farmers prepared the soil by hand with shovels and 
hoes, or by using plows pulled by cattle, which were not as strong as horses and 
so could not plow as deep.
 4. Multifactor productivity estimates for agriculture in the United States were first 
constructed in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Barton and Cooper 1948; Schultz 
1953; Ruttan 1956). For a comparative review and analysis of the sources of 
differences in the several aggregate agricultural production functions that have 
been estimated for U.S. agriculture, see Trueblood and Ruttan (1995). Note that 
from the beginning agricultural economists were using what, in the recent lit-
erature, have been termed “augmented” neoclassical production functions rather 
than Solow-type, two-factor production functions. For a review of total factor 
productivity estimates in developing countries, see Pingali and Heisey (2001).
 5.  In cross-country growth accounting, it has not been possible to account directly 
for improvement in the quality of inputs. Attempts are made to capture improve-
ments in the quality of labor input by including education and for improvements 
in the quality of capital and intermediate inputs by including investment in tech-
nical education or research and development in the cross-country production 
functions. Jorgenson and Gollop (1995) have estimated that during 1947–85, 
when total factor productivity in U.S. agriculture grew at an annual rate of 1.58 
percent, input quality change accounted for about one-third of the total factor 
productivity growth. Using a somewhat different approach, Shane, Roe, and 
Gopinath (1998) estimated that private research and development embodied in 
factor input quality accounted for about 25 percent of total factor productivity 
between 1949 and 1991.
 6.  The advantages of the Malmquist or frontier productivity index, in addition to the 
decomposition of total factor productivity into efficiency change and technical 
change, are twofold: 1) it is nonparametric and does not require a specification 
of the functional form of the production technology, and 2) it does not require an 
economic behavior assumption such as cost minimization or revenue maximiza-
tion (Färe, Grosskopf, and Knox Lovell 1994; Färe et al. 1994). The contempora-
neous Malmquist approach employed by Trueblood and Coggins (2001) identi-
fies the best-practice countries in each period and measures the change in each 
country’s performance relative to the change in the frontier. A country that shows 
a positive growth in total factor productivity may show negative Malmquist pro-
ductivity change because it may lag relative to the best-practice frontier. The 
sequential Malmquist approach that has been employed by Suhariyanto, Lusigi, 
and Thirtle (2001) does not permit negative technology shifts.
 7.  The issues discussed in this section are addressed in greater detail in Ruttan 
(1999).
 8.  Countries characterized by “absolute water scarcity” do not have sufficient water 
resources to maintain 1990 levels of per capita food production from irrigated 
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agriculture, even at high levels of irrigation efficiency, and also meet reasonable 
water demands for domestic, environmental and industrial purposes. Countries 
characterized by “severe water scarcity” are in regions in which the potential 
water resources are sufficient to meet reasonable water needs by 2025, but only 
if they make very substantial improvements in water use efficiency and water 
development (Seckler, Molden, and Barker 1999).
 9.  Estimates of losses in crop and animal production due to pests vary greatly by 
commodity, location, and year. However, estimates by reputable investigators 
run upwards of 33 percent of global food crop production. Losses represent a 
higher percentage of output in less developed countries than in developed coun-
tries. Among major commodities, the highest losses are experienced by rice 
(Yudelman, Ratta, and Nygaard 1998).
 10.  I have not in this paper discussed the potential impacts of health constraints on 
agricultural production. The increase in use of insecticides and herbicides associ-
ated with agricultural intensification have had important negative health effects 
on agricultural workers. The health effects of the resurgence of older diseases 
such as malaria and tuberculosis, are greatest in rural communities in develop-
ing countries. It is not too difficult to visualize situations in particular villages 
in which the coincidence of several health factors, including AIDS, could result 
in serious constraints on agricultural production (Pingali and Roger 1995; Bell, 
Clark, and Ruttan 1994; Haddad and Gillespie 2001). 
 11.  For a more detailed discussion of the evolution and structure of national and 
international agricultural research, see Ruttan (1982) and Huffman and Evenson 
(1993).
 12.  In 1995 it was estimated that global agricultural research expenditures amount-
ed to $33 billion (in 1993 dollars). Of this amount public sector expenditures 
amounted to $12.2 billion in developed countries and $11.5 billion in develop-
ing countries. Private sector expenditures for agricultural research amounted to 
$10.8 billion in developed and $0.7 billion in developing countries. Support for 
the CGIAR system declined from $334 million in 1990 to $305 million (1993 
prices) in 2000 (Pardey and Beintema 2001).
 13.  Between 1962 and 1990, crop yields in the former Soviet Union experienced 
modest gains relative to the world’s leaders. From the early 1990s, however, 
yield growth rates became negative, and by 1997 the yield gap between the coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union and the world leaders exceeded the levels of 
1962 (Trueblood and Arnade 2001).
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